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Recasting ‘Nuclear-Free Korean Peninsula’ as 
a Sino-American Language for Co-ordination 
 
 
Abstract:  A series of Six-Party Talks involving the United States, China, Japan, South 
and North Koreas, and Russia resulted in the emergence of a narrative of ‘nuclear-free 
Korean Peninsula’.  Given the prevalence of nuclear weapons amidst Sino-American 
rivalry, the area is hardly ‘nuclear-free’. Instead, the phrase has evolved into a convenient 
language for the US and China to signal to each other that there is a coincidence of wants 
in preserving the multilateral framework despite the Realpolitik dynamics. This article 
provides a Constructivist perspective to this particular aspect of Sino-American balance 
of power by taking the language of ‘nuclear-free’ seriously, recasting the narrative as a 
shared signifier for the US and China to co-ordinate their language despite the lingering 
bilateral rivalry.  
 
 
 
The sixth round of Six-Party Talks that started in March 2007 replicated previous sets 
of negotiations. Talks were sporadic at best. Despite the agreement reached in the 
fifth round (February 2005)—e.g., the denuclearisation of Korean Peninsula; 
normalisation of relations between the United States and the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK; North Korea); normalisation of Japan-DPRK relations; 
and economic assistance1—the US presidential elections in November 2008 added an 
element of uncertainty, with North Korea launching yet another missile in April 2009. 
In short, the numerous Six-Party Talks hosted by China failed to halt North Korea’s 
nuclear ambitions. If anything, it was the DPRK which benefited from the Beijing 
talks: status quo is preserved while its nuclear programme continues, despite a rebuke 
from its only remaining ally, China. 
 Pyongyang’s intransigence continues while Sino-American relationship 
undergoes various conflicts, ranging from renewed trade dispute over Chinese exports 
to allegations of cyber espionage involving Google, and the familiar exchange of 
words over American arms sale to Taiwan. President Barack Obama’s audience with 
Dalai Lama in February 2010 elicited renewed criticisms from Beijing. Above all, 
China’s flexing of its naval muscles in South China Sea and beyond adds potency to 
the resilience of balance of power considerations in the Asia-Pacific region. Their 
mutual scepticisms seem to endorse the view that Realpolitik remains the modus 
operandi in Northeast Asia, and that Realism prevails as the sole theoretical tool for 
interpreting Sino-American relationship. 
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 Despite this, it is striking to note China’s willingness to remain an ‘honest 
broker’ in the Six-Party framework by admonishing Kim Jong-il to be less obsessed 
with the purported American ‘enmity’.2 It seems as if the North Korean nuclear issue 
acts as an informal Sino-American vehicle for dialogue despite the sensitive bilateral 
relationship. In other words, North Korea provides a ‘common forum’ for the US and 
China such that they are content to be engaged in a careful co-ordination of language 
by reiterating their mutual desire for a ‘nuclear-free Korean Peninsula’, despite—if 
not because of—the bilateral frictions elsewhere.  
 How are we to conceptualise the emergence of such a ‘forum’ amidst Sino-
American balance of power? After having repeatedly threatened to withdraw from the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1993, and again in late 2002, 3  North 
Korea uses its nuclear programme as a bargaining chip to blackmail the US and its 
allies, not to mention China. Yet, this compels Washington and Beijing to utter 
similar-sounding pronouncements in such a way that the shared narrative of ‘nuclear-
free Korean Peninsula’ emerges as a common signifier denoting a significant 
coincidence of wants between the two governments indicating their mutual anxiety 
that the pursuit of balance of power potentially threatens the stability of Northeast 
Asia. Realism as a theoretical tool might help explain some of this; but the balance of 
power calculations alone cannot account for the emergence of a common language. 
This demonstrates that the bilateral balance of power needs to be understood in a 
nuanced way: while Realpolitik is still relevant, the capacity for Washington and 
Beijing to share a common language within this particular context also needs to be 
taken seriously. As such, the current diplomatic context encourages an additional 
Constructivist reading on top of the familiar Realist explanation in which we need to 
explore the language and symbols exchanged in the process. The article aims to 
explore the co-ordination of language through which the US and China have come to 
utilise this crisis as a forum for pronouncing shared anxieties. 
 This article is divided into five sections. The first section provides a very brief 
overview of the North Korean nuclear crisis that led to the emergence of a co-
ordinated language. The second section provides an account of how language needs to 
be taken seriously. Given the importance of perceptions in International Relations 
(IR), diplomatic relations can be recast as a macro-level exchange of symbols. If 
balance of power is a social construct,4 then its linguistic framework can be analysed 
so that the inherent meanings of phrases such as ‘nuclear-free Korean Peninsula’ can 
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also be discerned. The third section recasts the narratives of ‘nuclear-free’ as a 
language borne of iterated interactions throughout the North Korean nuclear crisis. 
This shared language provides a forum for both the US and China to reassure one 
another that at least they can co-ordinate their pronouncements, a precious commodity 
given Sino-American tensions elsewhere. The fourth section is a discourse analysis on 
the various uses of ‘nuclear-free’ narratives by both Washington and Beijing, paying 
close attention to the language through which both governments ‘talk about’ nuclear 
weapons and regional security in Northeast Asia. Finally, the fifth section discusses 
the need for recasting ‘nuclear-free’ narratives as a common language, suggesting that 
the Sino-American balance of power requires a more nuanced assessment. 
 
 
A Brief Background 
 
Historically, the Korean Peninsula is considered the powder keg of Northeast Asia 
and the conventional wisdom considers balance of power as the modus operandi for 
engagement in the region.5 Christopher Hughes argues that the crisis emerged after 
North Korea repeatedly refused International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
inspectors to monitor its nuclear processing plant at Yongbyon throughout the mid-
1990s, providing circumstantial evidence that Pyongyang continued with a 
clandestine nuclear programme.6 President George Bush (senior) stated in November 
1991 that DPRK’s alleged nuclear activity constituted a threat to regional security,7 
and ‘by late 1992…the IAEA had determined that North Korea had not fully declared 
its pre-1992 plutonium productions’.8 Despite its sympathy towards the DPRK, China 
appreciated that the nuclear allegation was potentially destabilising. As Ming Liu 
argues, 
 
China’s response toward the nuclear issue is clear. It represents not only a 
damage to North Korea’s development and survival, but also a major problem 
for China’s relations with the US and its diplomacy in the international 
community. At most, it is a grave threat to Chinese long-term security interests. 
China’s Foreign Ministry described Pyongyang’s action as dangerous 
adventurism aimed at obtaining US concessions. Some radical views even 
maintained that this is also an attempt to blackmail China.9 
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As such, China’s involvement in the North Korean nuclear dispute is symptomatic of 
the larger framework of balance of power in Northeast Asia.  
 China and North Korea became aware of the imperative for regime survival 
following the fall of Berlin Wall. To that extent, Beijing’s reluctance in persuading 
Pyongyang to forgo its nuclear programme was understandable; and the Realpolitik 
inclination within the Chinese leadership identified with North Korean nuclear 
calculations. For an impecunious state, the weapons of mass destruction are ‘the only 
means of attack’ available to it.10 The inherent danger of such a zero-sum posturing 
suggested that once Pyongyang went nuclear, other states, notably Japan, would 
follow suit thereby precipitating a regional arms race. Such fears intensified following 
the launch of a North Korean Taepodong missile across Japan in August 1998.11 A 
Realpolitik reading of Chinese foreign policy suggests that the perceived need to 
balance power against the American alliance compelled China to bankroll North 
Korea in order to sustain it as a buffer zone. 
 Both the US and China were reluctant to take decisive measures against North 
Korea, resulting in the October 1994 Framework Agreement between Washington and 
Pyongyang. It was agreed that, in exchange for North Korea freezing its nuclear 
programme, the regime was to be granted ‘nuclear technology and energy supplies 
estimated to cost US$4 billion in total over a five-year period’. 12  While the 
Agreement was primarily a bilateral arrangement between the US and DPRK, allies 
on both sides were enlisted to help. As The Economist puts it, ‘America, Japan, and 
China all have an interest in avoiding another crisis in the region whether triggered by 
a sudden increase in the flow of North Korean refugees or by another rocket-propelled 
raspberry from its unpredictable regime’. 13  China assumed the role of a broker, 
leading to a four-party meeting in April 1996 involving two Koreas, the US, and 
China providing a forum not only for them to try to iron out the differences, but also 
an opportunity for Beijing and Washington to engage in bilateral negotiations on 
wider issues.14 In other words, the nuclear issue represented a double coincidence of 
wants between the US and China over Northeast Asian security in general, such that 
the mid-1990s precipitated a period of delicate balance of power between the two 
states. As for Beijing, it was felt necessary to adopt a cautious approach hoping that 
neither Washington nor Pyongyang walked away from the fragile negotiations. 
Gary Samore notes that the admission by North Korea in October 2002 that ‘it 
was pursuing a secret [uranium] enrichment programme took Washington by 
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surprise’.15  Following the revelation, the first round of Six-Party Talks began in 
Beijing in August 2003 to forestall a potential downward spiral, with North Korea 
threatening to withdraw from the NPT by the end of the year.16 It is within this 
context that the second Six-Party Talks were held in February 2004 without any 
discernible outcome, followed by another round of Six-Party Talks in July 2005, only 
to re-affirm participants’ dream of ‘denuclearised’ Korean Peninsula.17 
A communiqué was finally agreed following the end of the seventh round of 
talks in September 2005. In it, the participants reluctantly ‘agreed to recognise the 
right of North Korea to develop a peaceful nuclear programme, reiterating the hopes 
for a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.18 A change in tactic by the Bush administration 
meant that the US finally acquiesced to a series of bilateral talks with the DPRK. 
However, Pyongyang remained defiant, detonating a nuclear device in October 2006 
eliciting a furious response from China. In an uncharacteristically strong language, 
Renmin Ribao stated that ‘the DPRK ignored [the] universal opposition of the 
international community and flagrantly conducted the nuclear test on 9 October. The 
Chinese government is resolutely opposed to it’.19 
 Tensions mounted over the Korean Peninsula in April 2009 when North Korea 
launched further missiles claiming them to be ‘experimental communications 
satellite[s]’.20 The arrest, and subsequent release, of two American journalists and a 
South Korean worker in mid-2009 represented North Korea’s increasing defiance. 
Superficially, it seems that the Six-Party Talks are doomed to failure, exacerbated by 
omnipresent differences in American and Chinese approaches to sanctions. 21 
Furthermore, such differences seem to vindicate balance of power considerations 
between the US and China as a primary mode of analysis in appreciating the North 
Korean nuclear crisis within the larger context of international politics in the Asia-
Pacific region. 
 
 
Rivalry and Common Language 
 
The balance of power explanation seems relevant in explaining Sino-American 
rivalry: the very instance of nuclear standoff over the Korean Peninsula can be 
explained away by it; and the recurrence of diplomatic and trade disputes seem to 
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vindicate Realist perspectives. Indeed, balance of power considerations can be readily 
identified. On the one hand, there is the US alliance with its nuclear umbrella 
stretching to the border with North Korea. On the other hand, China poses a regional 
counter-weight as another nuclear power with a rising military, especially naval, 
presence in South China Sea and beyond.22 Despite calls for a ‘nuclear-free’ Korean 
Peninsula, nuclear weapons proliferate in and around the region, such that it is 
tempting to cast away the language of ‘nuclear-free’ as a mere lip-service. The 
Economist admonishes the Obama administration to ‘[send a signal] that America will 
balance a rising China in such a way that China’s neighbours never have to take 
sides’.23 Hence, the default template for explaining the international politics of East 
Asia remains predominantly Realpolitik. 
 Yet, it is also the case that Beijing and Washington are careful not to escalate 
the friction. Alexander Wendt suggests that balance of power is a social construct:24 
any given social context is a product of socialisation by the parties involved, so that 
language plays an important role in it; and balance of power as a particular 
relationship is no exception. Power is relational, and needs multiple actors; and 
balance implies a cautious interaction between and among those involved. Put 
differently, power as a social concept means we need to be mindful of the 
‘psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is 
exercised’—including ones engaged in balance of power dynamics.25 Hence, we need 
to be aware of the inherent exchange of symbols and language, since it constitutes a 
crucial element within the social dimensions of balance of power in which the aim is 
not just about ‘frustrat[ing] the threatened preponderance of others, but should 
recognise the responsibility not to upset the balance itself’.26 This means that balance 
of power entails a careful exchange of signals. An exploration into such intangible 
dimensions is what is amiss with the current Realpolitik depiction of Northeast Asia. 
The penchant for straight-forward balance of power assumptions prevents us from 
considering how a context can gradually change over time, as participants realise the 
inherent dangers of the status quo, and seek to ameliorate some of its worst excesses, 
while the overall context of rivalry remains intact. 
 Hence, what we need is a nuanced reading of balance of power as a social 
relationship in which language constitutes a crucial factor. There is the temptation to 
enlist balance of power as the sole explanation for the North Korean crisis; but it is 
striking that the phrase, ‘nuclear-free Korean Peninsula’, is frequently reiterated by 
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both the US and China in this particular context. Superficially, balance of power 
considerations seem taken for granted in explaining North Korean motives in 
developing its nuclear capability and the Sino-American reactions to it; but once the 
gaze turns on to the US and China, they reiterate similar-sounding pronouncements in 
favour of further negotiations instead of preparing for military conflict, at least for the 
time being. Regardless of what Beijing and Washington mean by the phrase; and 
despite the existence of conflicts elsewhere, it seems that the nuclear crisis 
necessitates some form of linguistic co-ordination. China and the US seem inclined 
towards co-ordination as a preferred mode of interaction within the prevailing balance 
of power. Julie Gilson argues that the US did pay attention to Chinese concerns over 
Washington’s aggressive tactics against North Korea,27 and that China is beginning 
‘to show a willingness to promote joint leadership’ on the matter.28 The meeting 
between Chinese and American officials in March 2010 suggests this cautious 
balance: US State Department spokesperson, Philip Crowley, states that ‘we are 
focusing on the future of important issues that we can work together’, while Zhao 
Qizheng of China People’s Political Consultative Conference argues that ‘two drivers 
[the US and China] must consult with each other to drive the car’.29 As such, it seems 
that the two are exchanging tacit signals aimed at forestalling a regional nuclear arms-
race. 
 Thus, on the one hand, we are witnessing the resilience of balancing of power 
dynamics. Despite Pyongyang’s defiance, Beijing remains its steadfast ally, with Hu 
Jintao telling Kim Jong-il in October 2006 that the bilateral friendship is the ‘common 
treasure of both nations’.30 The American nuclear umbrella remains relevant as well. 
Ruan Zongze suggests that the US has steadily strengthened ‘existing relations with 
its allies in the Asia-Pacific region such as Japan’, buttressing its counter-weight 
against China.31 On the other hand, it is within this context that both Beijing and 
Washington seemingly share a willingness to sustain the Six-Party framework, as if 
there is a double coincidence of wants between the US and China over the benefits of 
protracted negotiations despite North Korean defiance. Pyongyang’s pledge never to 
return to the Talks seems to have hardened both the American and Chinese resolve to 
keep on talking for the time being. 
 While it is perfectly reasonable to expect the parties to maintain conversation 
while balance of power remains the predominant mode of interaction, the fact remains 
that the US and China are both reiterating the narrative of ‘nuclear-free’ to the extent 
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that this shared language seems to mean much more than what it implies on the 
surface. Put differently, while the ‘nuclear free’ narratives might be a convenient lip-
service for them, it is significant that the parties seem content in being associated with 
it despite its vagueness. Hence, it can be argued that some kind of co-ordination is 
emerging from the Six-Party framework, providing Beijing and Washington with a 
convenient forum upon which an informal line of communication is maintained 
precisely because the two are engaged in rivalry elsewhere. Within this context, 
‘nuclear-free’ seems to have gained an additional meaning symbolising American and 
Chinese non-intention of escalating this particular conflict. Balance of power might 
still be the modus operandi in Northeast Asia, but the language suggests that the 
parties are willing to collude with one another, at least in sending out a common 
message to Pyongyang—and to one another—that a military confrontation needs to be 
ruled out in the immediate future. 
 It is also the case that balance of power as a main toolkit for understanding 
international politics in East Asia needs a nuanced approach. Appreciating Sino-
American differences in material capabilities are useful, but their use of language also 
needs exploration. This is why language needs to be taken seriously. Even if both 
Beijing and Washington consider denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula to be an 
impossibility, they nonetheless regurgitate ‘nuclear free’ in their official 
pronouncements. This begs the question of why this remains the case if the situation 
is hopeless. Perhaps ‘nuclear free’ is devoid of its literal meaning; but the utterance of 
this phrase by both the US and China seems to suggest that it entails an altogether 
different signal that both sides are willing to use the Six-Party framework as a 
precious vehicle of dialogue, precisely because the relationship is fraught with 
conflicts. It is through their mutual desire to minimise the potentials for escalation that 
a need for a common language emerges; and their interaction—both hostile and 
accommodating—provides the backdrop for the emergence of certain set of signifiers 
that both Beijing and Washington can utilise to forestall a crisis.32 The Six-Party 
Talks suggest that, while balance of power remains resilient, it is also the case that co-
ordination is simultaneously taking place. The common language of ‘nuclear-free’ 
acts as a signal that the US and China are sending out tacit reassurances that, in this 
particular context, they are willing to co-ordinate their language over Pyongyang’s 
nuclear programme and Northeast Asian security in general. 
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‘Nuclear-Free’ Narratives as a Common Signifier of Mutual Anxiety 
 
Superficially, the balance of power dynamics remain as China enhances its naval 
presence in the Indian Ocean. People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) Rear 
Admiral, Yin Dunping, says, ‘[i]t is important to accelerate and improve the navy’s 
abilities to cross the ocean [to] escort, rescue and evacuate Chinese nationals abroad, 
maintain peace, and a variety of other military task’.33 In response, the US Admiral, 
Michael Mullen, suggests that China is ‘very focused on the US navy and our bases in 
that part of the world’.34 Furthermore, President Obama points out the latent zero-sum 
mentality within Sino-American policy circles, stating that ‘some in China think that 
America will try to contain China’s ambitions; some in America think that there is 
something to fear in a rising China’. 35  Yet, a further exploration reveals that a 
common language of ‘nuclear-free Korean Peninsula’ is emerging as a result of 
mutual anxieties shared by both Beijing and Washington. It is as if the symbolic 
nature of nuclear weapons and overall balance of power have mutated from being a 
tool of security into a vehicle of potential danger. 
 The threat posed by nuclear weapons is real for the actors involved, but what 
the nuclear weapons mean to them is also crucial in appreciating their shared anxieties. 
Wendt’s characterisation provides one perspective. He argues that ‘[f]ive hundred 
British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the US than five North Korean ones 
because of the shared understandings that underpin them’.36  To be sure, nuclear 
weapons remain deadly and that is one of the primary reasons why states value them. 
Yet, it is also the case that danger can boomerang-back on to nuclear powers 
themselves in the form of downward spiral of threat perceptions—the security 
dilemma.37 Nuclear weapons lose their efficacy as symbols of national security, and 
instead, re-emerge as potential drivers of insecurity, prompting a reconstruction of a 
different linguistic structure through which nuclear weapons are portrayed. Needless 
to say, both China and the US rely on them; but once proliferation of nuclear weapons 
reaches a certain point, the sense of enhanced security diminishes, superseded by the 
uncertainties of potential arms race as other players also seek to enhance their sense of 
security.38 As such, Sino-American anxieties over each other’s intentions in East Asia 
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that fuelled nuclear proliferation in the first place evolved into their mutual concern 
about what might happen if North Korea is left unchecked. Hence, an interesting 
element of the nuclear crisis is that both China and the US seem intent on signalling 
that a security dilemma is emerging; and that they are ready to share a common 
language to minimise the inherent risks.  
 Thus, the narrative of denuclearisation denotes the existence of mutual fears 
about nuclear proliferation in the vicinity of Korean Peninsula; and the Six-Party 
framework presents itself as a convenient linguistic space within which the two can 
engage in an informal dialogue. The nuclear crisis as a significant factor within this 
rivalry is now returning to haunt the two regional powers with a probability of 
unfettered arms race in Northeast Asia. Effectively, this is an Agent-Structure issue in 
practice.39 Agents reproduce structures; but there is nothing to prevent the structure 
from imparting contradictions between the agents’ understandings of the status quo, 
on the one hand; and their desire for a more accommodating environment, on the 
other. The Sino-American balance of power created a particular context within which 
Pyongyang justifies its nuclear programme, which in turn precipitates a new 
international environment that Beijing and Washington find dangerous.  
 David Campbell argues that ‘[d]anger is not an objective condition. It is not a 
thing that exists independently of those to whom it may become a threat’,40 to the 
extent that ‘[a]nything can be a risk’.41 The centrepiece of debate within Six-Party 
Talks entails the US arguing that North Korean nuclear programme threatens the 
stability of Northeast Asia, something to which Beijing tacitly agrees, on the one 
hand; while the DPRK emphasises that it is designed as a defensive posture, vis-à-vis, 
the US, on the other. Yet, it must be recognised that both arguments pay lip service to 
the recognition that denuclearisation is a necessity.42 This is why the language of 
‘nuclear-free’ needs to be taken seriously. The narrative might be a lip-service; but the 
fact remains that this vacuous phrase is reiterated in various policy pronouncements as 
a convenient signifier. Furthermore, the Sino-American reiteration of this phrase 
provides an interesting instance of co-ordination in an otherwise sensitive and 
adversarial relationship. The Obama administration seems particularly intent on 
sending out the ‘right’ signals, with President Obama stating that ‘[t]he relationship 
between the US and China will shape the 21st century, which makes it as important as 
any bilateral relationship in the world… That is the responsibility that together we 
bear’,43 casting the bilateral relationship as ‘partners out of necessity, but also out of 
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opportunity’.44 Hence, it is not as if peace is breaking out over Northeast Asia; but it 
also adds certain symbolism to the narratives of ‘nuclear-free Korean Peninsula’. It is 
an ambitious term and it is uncertain whether or not the interlocutors believe what 
they say. Whatever its meaning, it has been reified into a language through which 
China and the US preserve dialogue while animosities continue elsewhere. 
 To be sure, a Constructivist reading of the standoff does not predict an 
amicable outcome. Realists such as David Jones and Michael Smith quote Alastair 
Iain Johnston in deriding Constructivism’s ‘mythic “story about path dependence and 
mutual constitution” between the purported identity construction in East Asia on the 
one hand, and the reality of East Asian regionalism on the other’.45 Yet, it is striking 
to note that the narrative of ‘nuclear-free Korean Peninsula’ exists despite such 
Realist scepticisms. A penchant for balance of power considerations treats the 
narratives of ‘nuclear-free’ as mere lip-service, but this only begs the question of why 
they bother with such a language. Rather, their mutual desire for a common signifier 
needs to be taken seriously. While the interests of Beijing and Washington differ, it is 
a puzzle to see the two states uttering very similar narratives. Thus, only by 
appreciating the potentials for the emergence of a common platform can we make 
sense of this coincidence. The crucial point is that Sino-American balance of power 
and the associated sensitivities are real; but it is within these structural confines that a 
co-ordinated language emerges. This is one more reason why we need to delve into 
the very language upon which the Sino-American balance of power is constructed  
 Jutta Weldes et al. argue that, ‘[a]ctors and their insecurities are naturalised in 
the sense that they are treated as facts that, because they are given by the nature of the 
interstate system, can be taken for granted’.46 The North Korean nuclear crisis is an 
end product of this taken-for-grantedness: nuclear weapons were taken for granted as 
enhancing security. The problem emerges once such assumption boomerangs back to 
re-emerge as the very source of regional insecurity already made volatile as a result of 
other conflicts. This reified danger and the perceived need to ameliorate it partly 
explains China’s penchant for performing the role of an honest broker.47 Also, it is 
plausible to suggest that the realisation of the status quo as risky and unsustainable 
compelled the US to claim in July 2005 that, it has ‘no intention to attack or invade 
[DPRK]’, enticing North Korea to agree to the longer-term goal of ‘denuclearisation 
of Korean peninsula’.48  In the previous rounds, similar acknowledgements to the 
limits of balance of power were made. China recognised the potentials for an arms 
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race in Northeast Asia in April 2000;49 and North Korea announced in February 2004 
that all it wanted was a ‘security assurance’—something they still desire.50 As Roy 
argues, Beijing understands that DPRK’s adventures can potentially hurt itself, rather 
than strengthen its national interest in the longer run.51 Pre-9/11, Norman Levin notes 
that Beijing played a ‘generally constructive role in supporting efforts to draw North 
Korea into the world community.’52 The irony is that, following 9/11, Pyongyang’s 
stance effectively brought together rivals, inadvertently encouraging co-ordination 
between the US and China in this particular crisis. Hence, while a Realist theorising 
would have predicted an arms race in Northeast Asia, the result is that major actors 
are applying brakes on this purportedly dangerous momentum.53 
 
 
 ‘Nuclear-Free Korean Peninsula’ as a Shared Language 
 
The language of ‘nuclear-free Korean Peninsula’ as a familiar signifier within Sino-
American foreign policy pronouncements is most apparent in the October 1994 
Agreed Framework on the Nuclear Issue between the US and the DPRK. While the 
bulk of the document focuses on the technicalities of providing North Korea with 
light-water reactors (LWRs), there are numerous references to the idea of creating a 
‘nuclear-free’ peninsula. The second paragraph of the Preamble refers to ‘the June 11, 
1993 Joint Statement of the US and the DPRK to achieve peace and security on a 
nuclear-free Korean peninsula’, and that the parties have ‘decided to take the 
following actions for the resolution of the nuclear issue’. After discussing the 
technical details of LWR provision, Paragraph III stipulates that: 
 
III. Both sides will work together for peace and security of a nuclear-free 
Korean peninsula. 
 
1. The US will provide formal assurance to the DPRK, against the threat or 
use of nuclear weapons by the US. 
2. The DPRK will consistently take steps to implement the North-South 
Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. 
3. The DPRK will engage in North-South dialogue, as this agreed 
framework will help create an atmosphere that promotes such a dialogue. 
 
The Agreed Framework implies a tacit compact between the US and DPRK that a 
nuclear standoff somehow needs to be ameliorated. China, too, seems to appreciate 
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that the vague language of ‘nuclear-free’ can be leveraged to send a signal that multi-
party framework needs to be preserved. On the one hand, Beijing’s stance is that 
developing states have the right to pursue a safe nuclear programme;54 but on the 
other hand, the Chinese foreign ministry had to point out in January 2003—after 
Pyongyang announced its withdrawal from the NPT—that ‘we hope to continue to 
safeguard the universality of the NPT and will continue to work for the peaceful 
solution of the nuclear question of the DPRK’.55 Hence, the North Korean nuclear 
issue seems to have prescribed China’s preference into pursuing the role of an honest 
broker as its national interest. 
 Even if ‘nuclear-free’ is a lip-service, it nevertheless constitutes a central 
signifier in the language of Six-Party framework. The Joint Statement at the fourth 
round in September 2005 sates that they were held ‘for the cause of peace and 
stability on the Korean Peninsula’ to promote ‘denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula’.56 The then-Vice President Hu Jintao reiterated similar sentiments. In May 
2002, he stated that the ‘aim of China’s foreign policy is to safeguard world peace’ 
and that ‘it is in the common interests of China and the US to maintain peace and 
stability on the Korean Peninsula’. 57  At the close of the fifth round of talks in 
February 2007, the participants reiterated their commitment towards ‘a major and 
solid stride…towards the denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula’.58 Within the 
larger framework of regional security in Northeast Asia, Hu noted in May 2002 that, 
‘for various reasons, China and the US do not see eye to eye on some issues. Yet we 
can, through dialogue on an equal footing, increase our understanding, expand areas 
of agreement and generally reduce our differences’.59 Victor Cha argues that China’s 
goal is ‘non-confrontational solution and a “cherishing” of the Agreed Framework’.60 
The narratives of denuclearisation have become a convenient tool for the antagonists 
to reassure one another of their intentions—or non-intention—in light of their mutual 
misgivings. This denotes a set of emerging parameters within which the North Korean 
nuclear issue is to be framed; and in turn both the US and China are beginning to 
leverage the North Korean crisis into a valuable forum for informal dialogue. 
 Soeya Yoshihide suggests that China understands the magnitude of nuclear 
allegations against Pyongyang, and realises its ramifications not only for the stability 
of the Korean Peninsula, but also for the region as a whole.61 David Kang doubts the 
validity of balance of power assumptions in Northeast Asian IR in general, arguing 
that ‘China seems no more revisionist or adventurous now than it was before the end 
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of the Cold War. And no Asian country appears to be balancing against it’.62 David 
Shambaugh argues that China, along with the US, ‘share a common desire for peace 
and stability in the Asia-Pacific region’,63 making it easier for the US and China to 
employ similar language,64 with Ruan Zongze adding that despite the strengthening of 
US-Japan alliance, both Beijing and Washington are trying to allay mutual fears.65 As 
such, Beijing seems confident in preserving its status as an honest broker since this 
role comes with a sense of reassurance and intent in upholding the language of 
denuclearisation. This is apparent in Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing’s 
audience with Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang in March 2004 to lure North Korea back to 
the negotiating table,66 as well as Chinese delight in seeing the atmosphere improve 
slightly during July 2005, 67  before Pyongyang’s renewed intransigence by 2009. 
Despite its fragile nature, the symbolism itself that the talks are alive is enough to 
satisfy Chinese self-confidence in sustaining the momentum. 
 
 
Dovetailing of The Sino-American Language 
 
China’s resolve during the round of negotiations in July 2005 cannot simply be 
brushed aside as mere posturing, for that fails to address why China jealously guards 
its stance as an honest broker, given that a failure can diminish Beijing’s status and 
confidence. Acknowledging US concerns over alleged uranium enrichment 
programme during February 2004 is a strong indication that China is keen to keep the 
narratives of ‘nuclear-free Korean Peninsula’ alive.68 As Alastair Iain Johnston puts it, 
‘China’s leaders prefer the geopolitical status quo’,69 and hence shares an interest with 
the US and Japan in ‘supporting the institutions designed to (restrain) North Korea’ 
from tipping the nuclear balance.70 Adam Ward also argues that, ‘Washington and 
Beijing both view Pyongyang as a menace to regional security, and they share a 
commitment to a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula’.71 Hence, it seems that China is 
content to exploit the nuclear crisis as a convenient forum to maintain a particular 
linguistic framework along with the US. 
Back in 1997, Joseph Nye noted that ‘the US has rejected the argument that 
conflict with China is inevitable’, given the multitude of problems that can only be 
ameliorated through co-ordination rather than conflict. 72  A closer inspection of 
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Chinese actions casts doubts over whether Realpolitik thinking alone can explain the 
complexities of collusion amidst conflicts. Kyung-won Kim argues that, 
 
At the moment, the assumption that ‘order’ does not mean a hegemonic 
hierarchy seems to have freed the region’s major powers from the kind of 
compulsion or supremacy that characterised Asian international relations in 
the past.73 
 
Sung-Joo Han adds that ‘[i]n the short- to medium-term, China has the most to gain 
diplomatically from improved relations between North and South Korea’, and that, 
‘[i]t is a great irony that Korea today represents the principal strategic area where 
Chinese and US interests coincide and the two countries cooperate’.74 
This is the case even amid the transition from a Clintonian ‘strategic 
partnership’ to ‘strategic competition’ under the Bush administration, and then on to 
the Obama administration’s enthusiasm for closer bilateral relations. Indeed, the US 
finds it expedient to exploit China’s self-professed role as an honest broker. Ward 
notes that ‘Beijing secured US participation in the talks by arguing that these would, 
through China’s participation, be multilateral than bilateral as Pyongyang had 
insisted’.75 The linguistic space provided by the backdrop of 9/11, as well as the North 
Korean nuclear programme, made dialogue between Washington and Beijing less 
cumbersome, since their shared threat perception made the two aware that only 
through co-ordinated language can the threat of North Korean nuclear weapons be 
addressed. Alternatively, a Sino-American split over North Korea implies a forfeiture 
of prospects for future co-ordination.    
 The Chinese Foreign Ministry stated in November 2000 that China ‘has 
always been devoted to peace and stability on the [Korean] peninsula’ and it is 
‘willing to continue to play a constructive role for peace and stability on the Korean 
Peninsula’.76 Furthermore, Qin Gam, the spokesperson for the Chinese delegation to 
the fifth round, noted in July 2005 that ‘since the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue is 
complicated, it is normal for parties concerned to have different stances…. The heads 
of six delegations also agreed to “fish together”’. 77  In highlighting the linkage 
between the nuclear crisis and the need for wider Sino-American dialogue, Premier 
Wen Jiabao argued in September 2008 that the US and China 
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 may not see eye to eye on certain issues. This is nothing terrible. As long as 
 we engage in dialogue and consultation on the basis of equality and mutual 
 respect, we will be able to gradually dispel misgivings and enhance mutual 
 trust.78 
 
The Obama administration follows a similar line of argument, with Hillary Clinton 
stating in an interview to a Japanese journalist in February 2009 that ‘the six-party 
talks are a good forum’, adding that ‘Japan, China, and the United States have a lot of 
concerns in common’, leaving open the possibility of a ‘trilateral dialogue’.79  In 
another interview to CNN, she argues that ‘North Korea can be either of those 
[“tyrannical unpredictable country” or “a country that has the ability to act 
rationally”]’.80 The New York Times quotes her as saying that ‘the most immediate 
issue is to continue the disarmament of their nuclear facilities and to get a complete 
and verifiable agreement as to the end of their nuclear program’, but adding that 
‘North Korea is on China’s border, and I want to understand better what the Chinese 
believe is doable’.81 
 As such, the North Korean nuclear issue is emblematic of contemporary 
balance of power in Northeast Asia: that both Beijing and Washington remain weary 
of one another on the wider issues of security in Northeast Asia; but where their 
mutual anxieties and interests coincide, balance of power necessitates a particular 
linguistic device to maintain it. In other words, balance of power is not just about the 
tangible effects of differences in material capabilities, but it also involves the 
employment of intangibles such as language and symbols. Hence, the Sino-American 
balance of power is one form of a social relationship based around a particular 
linguistic framework. 
The concerted efforts at bringing North Korea back into the multi-party 
framework exemplify the emergence of a common forum for Sino-American 
conversation. In essence, both Beijing and Washington are comfortable in using a 
shared language to entice Pyongyang back into negotiations.82  On the one hand, 
Pyongyang’s efforts at driving a wedge through the alliance after the July 2005 
meeting had exposed an inherent fragility in the Six-Party framework; but on the 
other hand, it also revealed that the actors are still intent on reiterating the language of 
denuclearisation amidst North Korean defiance. 83  The perseverance of this new 
signifier in light of difficulties and challenges is a good indication of its resilience. 
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Nuclear Crisis as a Precious Linguistic Space 
 
The emergence of ‘nuclear-free’ as a common language and the Six-Party framework 
as a convenient forum for the US and China does not indicate an advent of bilateral 
rapprochement. Indeed rivalries remain elsewhere: apart from China’s maritime 
ambitions, the 2007 financial crisis revealed the influence of China as the biggest 
creditor of US debt, encouraging Beijing to challenge Washington’s fiscal and 
monetary policies; the resurgence of a likely trade war between the two states over 
American allegations of Chinese dumping; as well as the row over carbon emissions 
representing shifting Sino-American influence in international conferences, among 
other disagreements. These indicate the persistence of bilateral sources of conflict; 
hence, it is significant that the North Korean nuclear issue still concentrates the minds 
in Beijing and Washington to reproduce the mutual language of co-ordination. 
 Japan’s National Institute for Defence Studies (NIDS) is nervously observing 
this. The 2009 Higashi-Ajia senryaku gaikan (East Asian Strategic Review) suggests 
that the final days of Bush Administration recast China as a ‘responsible stakeholder’ 
spanning political, economic, and strategic areas. It argues that China remains a 
potential threat to the US, but this in turn encourages the view that a better line of 
communication needs to be maintained, evidenced by the US-China memorandum of 
understanding in March 2008 establishing a hotline.84 Furthermore, NIDS suggests 
that the Chinese leadership insists on a ‘peaceful rise’;85 and refers to Hu Jintao’s 
statement in January 2008 stipulating that China is ‘determined to contribute towards 
a harmonious world’. 86  As if to underline its intentions, the PLAN invited USS 
Fitzgerald belonging to the US Seventh Fleet to the port city of Qingdao in April 2009 
as part of China’s 60th anniversary celebrations.87 
  While I am not suggesting that this semblance of rapprochement in 2009 is 
the direct result of shared anxieties over North Korea, it is worth pointing out that it 
parallels the emergence of a shared language over Korean Peninsula. The ability of 
the US and China to collude over North Korea is an indication that this balance of 
power is significantly more nuanced than a mere series of quid-pro-quo. Differences 
persist; but there are also signs that the coincidence of mutual interests exists. Ruan 
captures this ambivalence well, arguing that, 
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 For the foreseeable future, the China-US relationship will generally remain 
 stable—yet also uncertain in some areas. China consistently adheres to 
 seeking cooperation on the issues of common concern while maintaining 
 different views from the world’s sole superpower in some areas of dispute.88 
 
President Obama admits to this ambivalence. In November 2009, he stated that, 
 
 The rise of a strong, prosperous China can be a source of strength for the 
 community of nations…. I know there are many who question how the United 
 States perceives China’s emergence. But in an inter-connected world, power 
 does not need to be a zero-sum game, and nations need not fear the success of 
 another. Cultivating spheres of co-operation—not competing spheres of 
 influence—will lead to progress in the Asia-Pacific.89 
 
This inherent optimism within the Obama administration is reiterated in other 
pronouncements. Secretary of State Clinton pointed out that, 
 
 We are asking our partners to help dissuade all nations from facilitating, 
 directly or indirectly, North Korea’s attempts to enhance and proliferate its 
 nuclear and missile technologies.90 
 
 Meanwhile, Shi Yinhong describes Beijing’s position as ‘still want[ing] to 
leave some room for financial transactions for normal trade’ with Pyongyang,91 and 
while the US wants to do something on most issues’, including North Korea, ‘China 
can deliver much less than the US expects’.92 Despite such differences, China is able 
to respond to the narrative of harmony. The Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Qin Gang, 
responded to the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 in 
June 2009 by suggesting that, 
 
 China wishes to reiterate that to bring about denuclearisation of the Korean 
 Peninsula, oppose nuclear proliferation and safeguard peace and stability on 
 the Peninsula and in Northeast Asia is in the common interests of all parties.93 
 
President Hu underlined this in November 2009, when he stated that, 
 
 Given our differences in national conditions, it is only normal that our two 
 sides may disagree on some issues, [but] what is important is to respect and 
 accommodate each other’s core interests and major concerns.94 
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Hence, the language of reassurance is shared by the US and China as the two 
governments reiterate their intentions to co-ordinate over North Korea and to promote 
stability in Northeast Asia. This seems unattainable given Pyongyang’s intransigence; 
and the Sino-American conviction that balance of power as a primary mode of 
interaction still prevails. This makes it all the more significant that the language of 
nuclear crisis is converging. 
 The common concerns shared by Beijing and Washington seem to have 
dovetailed nicely into a convergence of mutual anxieties; and that the North Korean 
nuclear issue emerged as a convenient forum within which both governments are able 
to reiterate similar-sounding aspirations, while the familiar balance of power 
dynamics are played out elsewhere. Pyongyang’s continued defiance remains their 
primary concern; yet, the US and Chinese efforts at reassuring one another over their 
non-intention to escalate the crisis lend themselves to the argument that the North 
Korean nuclear issue as a product of Sino-American balance of power nevertheless 
requires a nuanced reading of how shared linguistic space emerges amid rivalry. 
‘Nuclear-free Korean Peninsula’ as a condition remains a distant dream, but as a set 
of narratives, it provides a significant scope for permitting two rivals to co-ordinate 
their pronouncements with a scope for certain spill-overs into other aspects of their 
relationship in the Asia-Pacific region.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The two main regional players in Northeast Asia—the US and China—both seem 
intent on preserving the momentum that emerged following a series of negotiations 
over Pyongyang’s nuclear allegations even in light of its continuing defiance after its 
most recent missile test in April 2009. The multilateral framework involving six states 
is suspended at the time of writing; but there is a faint hope that the Six-Party 
framework is still alive. Looking back, the September 2005 agreement with North 
Korea in which Pyongyang signalled that it might be ready to consider dismantling its 
nuclear programme turns out to be premature:95 while it was a positive step forward 
back then, the process has now stalled. 96  Yet, the November 2005 meeting that 
adjourned no sooner than it had convened bought time for China to ‘save face’ and 
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maintain some semblance of integrity. It shows that China is still steadfast on its self-
proclaimed role as an honest broker determined to preserve the discussions by urging 
the hermit kingdom to subscribe to the current multilateral framework in future 
rounds,97 this being the case even in mid-2009 after North Korea released two US 
journalists and a South Korean worker following overtures by both the Obama and 
Lee Myong-bak administrations. Despite this, the significance of the North Korean 
issue lies not only in its potential to upset the status quo in Northeast Asia, but also in 
the way narratives of ‘nuclear-free Korean Peninsula’ has become a common 
language for the US and China to signal each other that they share common anxieties. 
This is a significant departure from the conventional wisdom of Realpolitik 
suggesting that the region survived to become the sole remaining battlefront of the 
Cold War.98 
 This is not to deny that the balance of power considerations need to be 
discarded. Indeed, China’s naval strategy suggests that it is an increasingly useful 
conceptual tool for explaining the current developments in Northeast Asia.99 Balance 
of power explanations are still relevant, but when we turn our attention to the 
language of ‘nuclear free Korean Peninsula’, we also witness the seeming collusion of 
mutual anxieties between Washington and Beijing. Hence, we can observe both the 
US and China reiterating the phrase as a convenient signifier to signal that the status 
quo is potentially detrimental. This seems to indicate the dovetailing of mutual 
anxieties in and around the Korean Peninsula providing Beijing and Washington with 
a forum for them to engage in reassuring one another of their non-intentions in 
escalating the crisis; and to exploit the existing line of communication to avert 
unnecessary conflict. 
 The proponents of security community must await the current arrangement to 
evolve into a more formalised institution capable of identifying common threats and 
reacting in a co-ordinated fashion, let alone, define exactly what is meant by ‘nuclear-
free’ Korean Peninsula. This might not materialise in the end. The current 
arrangement falls well short of collective identity formation allowing participants to 
engage with one another with full confidence.100 The North Korean missile tests in 
July 2006 and April 2009 seem to have delayed further progress, if not presaging an 
end to the multilateral framework. The nuclear test in October 2006 proved to be a 
significant breach of trust between Pyongyang and Beijing, with the latter calling it a 
‘brazen act’ that ignores the longstanding opposition by international community101—
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an ‘unusually harsh words from North Korea’s biggest provider of aid and its only 
friend’.102 But the way in which the international community keeps on addressing this 
concern suggests that a focus on the collusion of Sino-American language is still a 
relevant mode of analysis over what the parties are trying to achieve. 103  While 
pessimism lingers following repeated assertion by Pyongyang that it will never return 
to the Six-Party Talks, once the gaze is turned on to the emerging linguistic 
framework between the US and China, unfettered pessimism seems less justifiable. 
Sino-American balance of power lingers; but informal lines of communication also 
remain open for the time being; and when it comes to North Korea, they seem 
comfortable enough in sharing this language, however unrealisable the objective 
might be. An introspection into the way participants at the multilateral talks behaved 
suggests an emergence of a forum in which the parties agree on the importance of co-
ordinated approach to North Korea by shunting aside old rivalries, however temporary 
that might be.  
 The implications are significant. The seemingly Realpolitik outlook of 
international relations in Northeast Asia nevertheless instantiates an emergence of a 
common, normative, framework. Put differently, balance of power needs to be recast 
as a form of macro-level social relations in which common language needs to be taken 
seriously if we are to adequately appreciate its ramifications. It is all too tempting to 
treat the US and China as rivals: their interests diverge on many fronts, but they are 
also keen not to push their differences too far.104 No doubt this is astute bargaining. 
Yet, it is equally necessary to explore their shared use of a similar set of signifiers 
within a particular framework. As such, this mode of analysis lends itself to taking 
ambiguities seriously, enabling us to observe the subtleties of informal institutional 
structures in East Asia. There is no indication of how long China will stick to its role 
as an honest broker; but its current adherence to it is noteworthy. Such is the 
significance of the manner in which governments around the Asia-Pacific region, 
including the US, are behaving today that warrants an infusion of Constructivist 
nuance into the prevailing Realpolitik considerations. 
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